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ABSTRACT 
 
Sustainable development requires resources that 
are not small, particularly in the funding aspect. 
The government has tried to maintain the state 
revenue as by giving efforts to become a sovereign 
state through financing strategic projects funded by 
state revenues. Customs and Excise are one of the 
main components that are a source of development 
funding. Several issues related to reform in the 
government sector were carried out to improve the 
management of the country in order to increase 
customs and excise revenues. This research aims to 
analyze the issue of reform which has become the 
vigorous action from the government in collecting 
customs and excise. Error Correction Model 
(ECM) was employed for this research. Based on 
empirical results revealed that several institutional 
and political reform proxies are playing an 
important role in increasing customs and excise 
revenues. In addition, several issues for further 
research in the future are delivered to complete the 
analysis. 
 
Keywords: Customs and Excises, Institution, 
Politics, ECM 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
  
Pembangunan ekonomi yang berkelanjutan 
membutuhkan sumber daya yang tidak sedikit 
terutama dari segi pendanaan. Pemerintah 
selalu berusaha menjaga pos penerimaan negara 
sebagai bentuk usaha menjadi negara yang 
berdaulat melalui pembiayaan proyek-proyek 
strategis yang didanai penerimaan negara. Bea 
dan cukai merupakan salah satu komponen 
utama yang menjadi sumber pendanaan 
pembangunan. Beberapa isu terkait reformasi di 
bidang pemerintahan dilakukan untuk 
meningkatkan pengelolaan negara termasuk 
dalam rangka meningkatkan penerimaan bea 
dan cukai. Penelitian ini fokus untuk 
menganalisis isu reformasi yang mejadi 
semangat pemerintah dalam melakukan 
pemungutan bea dan cukai. Model yang 
digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Error 
Correction Model (ECM). Berdasarkan hasil 
empiris menunjukkan bahwa beberapa proksi 
reformasi kelembagaan dan politik berperan 
penting dalam meningkatkan penerimaan bea 
dan cukai. Selain itu, beberapa isu untuk 
penelitian lebih lanjut di masa depan 
disampaikan untuk menyempurnakan analisis.  
 
Kata Kunci: Bea dan Cukai, Kelembagaan, 
Politik, ECM 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
State revenue has always been an 
important issue to be discussed in order 
to achieve sovereignty, especially the 
ability to finance state expenditures 
which has a multiplier effect on 
economic growth (Ndiaye, 2017). There 
is improving awareness among policy 
makers that domestic revenues should 
become the main source of financing in a 
development while international 
assistance, such as Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), plays an important role 
as a support. A sovereign state is a 
necessity that has always been the goal of 
every leader in the world. To obtain such 
sovereignty, a large effort is required 
especially in terms of revenue so that the 
state is able to finance expenditure 
independently. 
Several revenue posts are the 
mainstay particularly from the tax sector. 
Furthermore, there is one aspect which 
also simultaneously describes economic 
interaction with other countries through 
international trade. These components are 
import and export duties. In addition, 
excise tax revenue is also one relied upon 
because of its existence. The existence 
also limits the production of certain 
goods and imposes levies based on the 
Law. However, from an economic 
standpoint, goods subject to excise tax 
can contribute to state revenues and 
absorb a lot of labor. 
The high revenue from customs and 
excise has implications for increasingly 
large state budget allocations. It makes 
the development in various sectors such 
as health and education infrastructure can 
be achieved. Acceptance that goes into 
the state treasury is an indicator of state 
capacity, state formation, and power 
relations in a society (John, 2006). Thus, 
the role of customs and excise is very 
vital in the economy, especially in 
promoting economic growth (Jelilov and 
Abdulrahman, 2017). On the other hand, 
developing countries still experience 
many obstacles in maximizing revenue 
from the tax sector including customs 
and excise. This results in the realization 
of customs and excise receipts sometimes 
is not in accordance with the targets 
previously set. Various causes that 
become obstacles are, corruption, 
institutions, complicated administration, 
and political conditions (Fjeldstad, 2014). 
In Indonesia, levies on customs and 
excise are carried out by the Directorate 
of General of Customs and Excise under 
the Ministry of Finance of the Republic 
of Indonesia. Furthermore, any levies 
collected by the Director of General of 
Customs and Excise will go directly to 
the state treasury and be managed as 
fiscal revenues which are then allocated 
to various planned development 
programs. The ability of the Directorate 
of General of Customs and Excise to 
collect their fees, in the past few years, 
should be appreciated because they were 
able to achieve a realization that 
exceeded the target. The amount of 
customs and excise collected can be seen 
from the graph below.
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Figure 1. Customs and Excises Revenues 2008-2018 (Trillion) 
  Source: Statistics of Economy and Finance (SEKI) BI and Ministry of Finance (processed) 
 
Figure 1 indicates that in the last 10 
years, customs and excise revenues 
continued to increase consistently. Only 
in 2010 and 2016 there was a decrease in 
customs revenue. Nonetheless, overall 
Indonesian customs and excise revenues 
consistently experience increases. In 
simple terms, the increase in customs and 
excise implies that there have been 
improvements from various sides, 
especially in terms of government 
institutions. In this case, it is the Director 
of General of Customs and Excise which 
is implementing regulations and also 
supported by economic conditions that 
continue to develop towards better 
direction, administrative simplification, 
and clean and efficient staffing in 
collecting. 
The Directorate of General of 
Customs and Excise is the main 
institution representing the government 
in implementing the Law and Regulation 
of the Minister of Finance. This 
institutional role in the economy is vital. 
Bureaucracy, administration, and legal 
certainty are some aspects that are 
fundamental issues, especially in 
developing countries. The implications of 
these aspects are reflected in the level of 
corruption and efficiency of the 
bureaucracy which is then widely 
considered as the main obstacle in 
economic development (Yang, 2008). 
Thus, the government must take an active 
role to continue in improving all aspects 
related to this matter. The role of the 
government in terms of institutions is the 
implementation of bureaucratic reforms 
which have been a passion in organizing 
state activities since the 1997 crisis. 
Therefore, government institutions, 
especially the Ministry of Finance, which 
is the country's lifeblood, are always 
counted as the spearhead of economic 
activity. The reforms are illustrated 
through the timeline as follows. 
 
  
July 1997       Oct 1998   July 2002          Dec 2006 
         Asian Crisis           IMF Intervention       Tax Modernization         Bureaucratic Reforms 
            (Partial Reforms)   (Integrated Reforms) 
       
Figure 2. Timeline of Bureaucratic Reforms 
 Source: (Wihantoro et al, 2015) 
 
Bureaucratic reform is a massive 
leap for government administration, 
particularly in vital sectors such as the 
Director General of Customs and Excise. 
The implications of this bureaucratic 
reform can be seen from state revenues in 
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the customs and excise sector which 
continue to increase from year to year, 
especially after a comprehensive 
integrated bureaucratic reform since 
2006. However, data from customs and 
excise revenues 2008-2018 reveals 
implicitly that the proportion of excise 
tax revenues is always far above the 
customs revenues. Even so, from the 
proportion of the duty itself, it turns out 
that the proportion of import duty is 
greater than the export duty, meaning that 
import activities are still higher than 
export activities in Indonesia. 
It gives an alarm to the government 
that the existence of goods with certain 
characteristics subject to excise such as 
cigarettes and alcoholic products become 
the backbone of state revenues. The 
supervision of these goods must be 
increased in addition to not only maintain 
limited circulation but also to avoid 
illegal goods are sold in the market, 
causing loss of potential tax revenues and 
reducing supervision of the circulation of 
the goods. On the other hand, supervision 
of imported goods is also a concern in 
addition to maintain revenues through 
import duties which also limits the 
circulation of foreign products 
domesticall so that domestic products are 
able to compete. 
On the other hand, the government 
must continue to encourage domestic 
export activities to increase the receipt of 
export duties so that income from the 
customs sector will increase. This will 
also make the domestic industry more 
independent because it is able to produce 
products that are able to compete not 
only in the domestic market but also in 
the international market. The existence of 
companies that employ a lot of labor 
must also be supported. Besides being 
able to become a net of poverty and 
unemployment, such companies are able 
to contribute high tax revenues to the 
state treasury. Therefore, the government 
must be seriously to safeguard the 
political and democratic climate and 
continue to improve the role of 
institutions in the customs and excise 
sector to become a sovereign country 
through sustainable state revenues. 
Bureaucratic and institutional 
reforms that form the basis and 
enthusiasm of the government are very 
interesting issues to be further analyzed, 
especially their influence on the customs 
and excise revenues. In addition, the 
system of democracy and the political 
climate in Indonesia are thought to play a 
role in providing stimulation for more 
productive economic activities. Legal 
certainty and the level of corruption that 
are usually the barrier of economic 
growth also become inseparable aspects, 
especially related to the collection of 
economic actors. Thus, further analysis 
needs to be carried out to see empirically 
the impact of institutional and political 
reforms on customs and excise revenues 
in Indonesia. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is a lot of research related to 
customs and excise revenues. However, 
the independent variables used vary 
widely. Not many previous studies used 
proxy for institutional and political 
reform to be analyzed. Some of the 
studies that are referred to are as follows. 
Modern countries have many functions to 
run. At its core is the role of its 
development, which seeks to improve the 
lives of its citizens and future generations 
in an inclusive, responsive, responsible, 
and sustainable manner. The ability of 
countries to meaningfully fulfill this role 
requires institutional capacity (Sherani, 
2017). A large amount of academic 
literature related to institutional theory 
over the past four decades has linked 
weak institutional quality and poor 
governance with lower private 
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investment, lower state revenues, lower 
economic growth, worse development 
outcomes, and inequality higher, among 
other correlations. 
In addition, formal institutional 
regulations are very important because 
they will create incentives that shape a 
behavior. Many aid interventions have 
failed because they do not take into 
account the governance and institutional 
problems. It is now widely accepted that 
institutions play an important role in 
reducing and growing poverty. Influential 
empirical evidence has become important 
in demonstrating the relationship 
between institutions and growth in 
particular (Joshi and Carter, 2015). 
Over the past two centuries, state 
revenues have not only increased 
dramatically in levels and volumes but 
their structure has also changed from the 
large dependence on customs revenues in 
the early 19th century to a stronger 
emphasis on income taxation in the 20th 
century (Andersson, 2018 ) From these 
studies democratic political factors make 
the ability of the government to levy to 
be reduced because the public at large 
has different preferences so that not all 
existing regulations can be applied at 
every level of society. 
The main dilemma in customs 
management, especially over the past two 
decades is to balance the need for trade 
facilitation as a process of simplification, 
standardization and integration of 
documents and procedures in the 
international supply chain, at one, and 
level of control and intervention, Facing 
this dilemma, customs clearance 
significantly changing its role and 
position in the international supply chain 
(Biljan and Trajkov, 2012). 
The institutional and political aspects 
that are happening in a country have 
many influences on economic growth. 
With a clean and efficient institutional 
condition, it will encourage bureaucratic 
service faster so that state officials, in 
this case the government, can carry out 
various policies quickly and precisely 
according to the needs in the field. On the 
other hand, a conducive and stable 
political situation will make producers 
and investors have incentives in the form 
of legal certainty, simple administration, 
and good conditions for people's 
purchasing power so that economic 
activities will be stimulated (Princen, 
2016). Furthermore, countries with 
democratic systems are more vulnerable 
to issues that occur in the society 
(Andersson, 2018). Therefore, the 
government must encourage a stable and 
democratic economic, social, cultural and 
legal climate. This is certainly 
implemented through good institutional 
and political conditions. 
Reforms in the customs and excise 
sector are seen as very important. On the 
other hand, based on meetings between 
OECD countries, the World Bank, and 
the World Economic Forum, there are 
clear differences between rich and poor 
countries in their ability to carry out 
customs reform (Peterson, 2017). In 
particular, the efforts of less developed 
countries to increase customs duties are 
hampered by an inadequate infrastructure 
and a weak regulatory environment. 
Further efforts are needed to determine 
the most important factors for countries 
to successfully carry out customs reform 
and the extent to which these reforms 
result in increasing trade and economic 
growth. 
The institutional role in supporting 
increased state revenues is crucial. 
Countries that began small and gradual 
reforms in economic institutions grew 
faster. Economic and political 
institutional reforms were triggered by 
the crisis of low growth and low 
investment. The order of reforms seems 
important for investment even though it 
is not important for growth. Countries 
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that start with reforms in economic 
institutions invest more, while those who 
start with political reform invest less 
(Kilishi, 2017). The results also show 
that countries that embark on political 
reform only grow slower and invest less. 
It is therefore recommended that 
countries that have not started any 
reforms must begin reforming economic 
institutions. Furthermore, those who start 
with political reform must also pay 
attention that is comparable to the reform 
of economic institutions. 
By continuing to improve the 
institutional role, the opportunity to 
commit corruption that is a barrier to 
development can be reduced and 
eventually closed, especially in the 
customs and excise sector which is 
vulnerable to corruption. It is because it 
concentrates much of the free power in 
the customs and excise agents who make 
high-economic decisions. For the 
company, it provides an opportunity for 
customs officials to take rent from the 
company. However, the presence of 
communication technology offers the 
possibility to limit the strength of this 
policy by reducing direct interactions 
between companies and customs officials 
(Laajaj et al, 2017). 
Reformation plays an important role 
in the economy of any country by 
improving the state revenue system. The 
government needs to increase revenue to 
fulfill social obligations (Munene and 
Nduruhu, 2016). Understanding the 
power behind institutional change is a 
significant challenge in political 
economy. While the prevalence of strong 
executive constraints has increased over 
time. From a theoretical perspective, 
leaders with a power base have far 
weaker reform motives. Empirically, it is 
found that tenacious leadership traits tend 
not to adopt strong executive constraints 
(Besley et al., 2016).  
During the current reform period, it 
turns out that the condition of the 
bureaucracy has not undergone many 
fundamental changes. There are at least 
two complex aspects that occur in 
governance, namely: first, managerial 
aspects related to governance of all 
processes of technical procedures that are 
running in the organizational structure 
based on the main tasks and functions to 
achieve predetermined performance 
goals; and second, human resources 
asoects that concern the capacity and 
capabilities of the apparatus in charge of 
relying on the main tasks and functions in 
the organization along with their respons 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Two main data sources are used in 
this study. They are from The 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
which is used as an independent variable, 
and from Bank Indonesia for Economic 
and Financial Statistics and the Ministry 
of Finance which is used as a dependent 
variable. ICRG is a credible and 
independent international institution and 
has the main objective of indexing 
certain indicators in a country. 
Government, socioeconomic and 
investment variables are in the form of a 
scale of 0-12; legal variables, corruption, 
ethnicity, and democracy are in the form 
of a scale of 0-6; and bureaucratic 
variables are in the form of a scale of 0-4. 
The higher the scale, the better the 
variable and vice versa. The time series 
used are from year of 1985-2016. The 
dependent variable consists of total 
customs and excise receipts. However, 
the total revenue from both is a single 
unit of work carried out by the same state 
institution so that it will be easier to 
make estimation.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Max Min Std. Dev 
Customs 46553,46 182943,8 141,100 55011,96 
Government 7,2304 10,750 4,8750 1,2990 
Socioeconomics 5,5403 8,5833 2,0000 1,8335 
Investment 6,8697 9,1250 4,0000 1,5398 
Corruption 1,9934 3,8333 0,0000 1,1865 
Law 2,8059 4,7500 2,0000 0,8026 
Ethnicity 2,0572 3,0000 1,0000 0,5935 
Democracy 3,7799 5,0000 1,0000 1,0422 
Bureaucracy 1,6067 3,0000 0,0000 0,9055 
      Source: processed (2019) 
 
Furthermore, to estimate the 
independent variables on the dependent 
variable, an econometric model is used, 
namely Error Correction Model (ECM) 
which refers to the study of Andersson 
(2018). The choice of this model is 
intended to further analyze the 
relationship among variables which will 
then achieve equilibrium in the long term 
as indicated by the occurrence of co-
integration among variables. 
Furthermore, there are conditions that 
must first be met in using the ECM 
model, that is, all estimated variables are 
not stationary at the level. Based on the 
results of stationarity test using 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF), all 
tested variables are at the first difference 
level (see Appendix 1), so that in the next 
stage the ECM model can be used to 
estimate. 
In simple terms, the independent 
variables used in the study consist of 
institutional and political reforms which 
are then used to represent the two 
variables. The variables institutional 
reform use government index, corruption, 
law, and bureaucracy proxy, while the 
political variables use the proxy index of 
democracy, socio-economy, ethnicity, 
and investment. Thus, the basic model 
used is as follows. 
 
 
Cust = f (Ins, Pol)           (1) 
ΔCust/ΔIns < 0 
ΔCust/ΔPol < 0 
 
Where: Cust is customs and excises 
revenue; Ins is a proxy for variable 
institutional reform; and Pol is a proxy 
for variable political reform. 
 From the basic model (1) then 
transformed into the ECM model as 
follows. 
DCust = α0 + α1 Dins + α2 DPol +   
               α3 DIns(-1) + α4 DPol(-1) 
               + α5 ECT            (2) 
Where:  DCust = Cust – Cust(-1)  
  DIns   = Ins – Ins(-1)  
  DPol  = Pol – Pol(-1)  
  ECT   = Ins(-1) + Pol(-1)   
                            – Cust(-1) 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Estimation Results 
In the first stage, as mentioned in 
section 3, the first condition for 
estimating using the ECM model is 
ensuring that there is no stationary data at 
the level. To determine the level of 
stationarity, this study uses the ADF test. 
The test will simply show the results of 
stationarity tests on each variable studied. 
All data must be at the first level of 
difference for then can be continued at 
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the estimation stage. By using the 
spurious regression problem, ECM model 
can be overcome by using the right 
difference variable in the model. Valid 
ECM models indicate co-integration or 
long-term relationships among variables. 
The following are the estimated results 
using the ECM model.
 
Table 2 
Estimation Results using Error Correction Model (ECM) 
 Variable  Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Democracy -0.175207 0.229057 0.0528 
Ethnicity 0.386573 0.419974 0.3678 
Law -0.301252 0.397520 0.0570 
Investment 0.585314 0.491273 0.2468 
Government  -0.948453 0.345905 0.0122 
Socioeconomics -0.475826 0.363789 0.2050 
Corruption -0.182085 0.093939 0.0661 
Bureaucracy 0.180190 0.159356 0.0709 
ECT(-1) -0.267387 0.074273 0.0017 
R-squared 0,594477   
Adj R-squared 0,420681   
Durbin-Watson 2,383092   
Prob(F-statistic) 0,009675   
Source: processed (2019) 
 
Based on the estimation results 
above, it reveals that there are five 
variables which individually influence 
the dependent variable, namely the index 
of democracy, law, government, 
corruption, and bureaucracy. Meanwhile, 
the other three variables, namely ethnic, 
investment, and socioeconomic indiates 
no effect. Furthermore, the estimation 
results also indicate that the ECT (-1) 
value is -0.267387 with a probability that 
is significantly below 1%. Thus, from the 
ECM model estimated there will be co-
integration between variables in the long 
run at a rate of 26%. Significant F-
statistic values also indicate that the 
estimated model is appropriate because it 
shows the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent. 
This finding is also reinforced by the 
Adjusted R-squared value of 0.420681 
which means 42% of the independent 
variables affect the dependent variable 
while the rest are influenced by variables 
outside the model. 
To strengthen the findings that 
indicate a long-term relationship between 
variables, this study also adds a co-
integration test using the Johansen co-
integration test. Co-integration is a long-
term relationship among variables that 
although individually are not stationary, 
but a linear combination among these 
variables can become a standard. co-
integration tests can be used to determine 
whether two or more economic variables 
or financial variables have a long-term 
balance relationship. If the data variables 
are stationary, it means that the variables 
are co-integrated or have a long-term 
relationship. The co-integration test 
results using Johansen co-integration are 
as follows. 
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Table 3 
Result of Johansen Co-integration Test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical Value 
Probability 
None*  0.985535  428.1965  197.3709  0.0000 
At most 1*  0.943587  301.1150  159.5297  0.0000 
At most 2*  0.895448  214.8632  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 3*  0.781680  147.1211  95.75366  0.0000 
At most 4*  0.718041  101.4673  69.81889  0.0000 
At most 5*  0.623599  63.48751  47.85613  0.0009 
At most 6*  0.557644  34.17446  29.79707  0.0147 
At most 7  0.268930  9.705237  15.49471  0.3041 
At most 8  0.010209  0.307851  3.841466  0.5790 
Trace Indicates 7 co-integrating eqn(s) at the level 0.05 level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
The co-integration test results in 
Table 3 further reinforce the findings of 
previous estimation using the ECM 
model that in the long run there is a 
relationship between variables and co-
integrated. This is based on the Trace 
Statistics value which is greater than the 
Critical Value. In addition, the value of 
Eigenvalue also shows the same thing, 
the value is greater than the probability. 
Based on the estimation results using 
the ECM model and cointegration test, 
the chosen model shows there is a 
relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. 
Next, based on the estimation results, 
they will be discussed, interpreted and 
linked to the issues that occur in the field 
as well as supported by relevant 
researches. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
Based on the estimation results using 
the ECM model (Table 2), democratic 
proxies show a negative and significant 
relationship at the level of 10% towards 
customs and excise revenues with a 
coefficient of 0.1752017. It means that 
each increase in the democracy index by 
1 point receives revenue and excise 
increases by 17 points.  
Many previous studies showed that 
democracy has a positive and significant 
effect on state revenues, especially from 
the taxation sector. However, previous 
research has been carried out in 
developed countries such as Europe and 
the United States (Andersson, 2018). 
The role of democracy in the country is 
very important in educating citizens to 
be free in determining the continuity of 
their lives, including those related to the 
taxation sector, like customs and excise. 
An employee who collects customs and 
excise realizes that the work he does will 
greatly affect the sustainability of the 
government. Meanwhile from the side 
that is levied on excise, he considers 
what is done as a form of contribution to 
the country. This is very much 
influenced by factors in the number of 
residents in developed countries who are 
educated so that they realize the 
importance of the role of excise tax on 
the state. 
In contrast, in developing countries 
such as Indonesia, found that that a high 
level of democracy is specifically 
needed in countries rich in natural 
resources to make the contribution of 
natural resources contribute to higher 
domestic income including in terms of 
excise revenues and no longer a barrier 
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to a sustainable state revenue system 
(Ehrhart, 2011). On the other hand, the 
level of democratic education of the 
people who are still less educated in 
terms of politics and democracy causes a 
low awareness of the contribution of the 
state. Some of the contributing focuses 
are taxes, duties and excise. The 
employees and the public can cheat each 
other or even collude. This is a joint 
task, including the government and non-
government sectors, to improve 
intelligent and constructive democracy 
education. 
The next proxy that affects the 
customs and excise revenues is law with 
a coefficient of 0.301252. An increase in 
the legal index by 1 point causes 
customs and excise revenues to drop 30 
points. Transmission that can be an 
argument here is related to the efforts to 
eradicate the practice of collusion, 
corruption and nepotism. Law is the last 
tool used by the government if 
something happens outside the authority 
deliberately carried out by individuals 
both from the government and non 
government. The increase in this index 
means that the practice activities that 
violate many authorities are carried out 
and has implications for the reduction of 
levies on customs and excise. 
The public sector is always a concern 
for those who want to commit fraud. 
Therefore, Prabowo and Cooper (2016) 
suggested that bureaucratic reforms in 
relevant institutions be followed by 
rationalization and comprehensive 
socialization so that habits aimed at 
seeking personal gain would fade and 
eventually disappear. All of that needs to 
be executed seriously together with all 
relevant stakeholders so that the 
supporting pillars will further strengthen 
the foundations of the actors in them 
supported by various substantive actions 
in a sustainable manner. 
Government proxies have a positive 
and significant effect with a coefficient 
of 0.948453, which means that an 
increase in index of 1 point causes 
customs and excise revenues to increase 
by 98 points. However, this proxy is one 
of the core proxies. The role of 
government is extremely important in 
making regulations and implementation. 
Furthermore, several other studies such 
as (Joshi and Carter, 2015), (Yusriadi, 
2018), (Kilishi, 2017), (Sherani, 2017), 
(Chirot et al, 2015), and (Robinson, 
2015) explain that the government holds 
the main key in implementing reforms in 
all fields. However, the institutional 
reforms that have been carried out must 
continue to be maintained and evaluated 
every certain period of time to see 
whether the reforms implemented so far 
are in line with the same objectives as 
well as to continue to be improved if 
there are still gaps that can still be 
developed in the future. 
In the end, if the government 
actively participates in supervision 
problems in the field, it will make output 
increase. This is because planning 
without execution is futile, but 
unattended execution will be even more 
futile because there is twice the waste, 
the budget that comes out and is 
counterproductive of what is achieved. 
Likewise in terms of state revenues from 
the customs and excise sector. Periodic 
supervision of the various 
implementation of established 
regulations is very important to keep the 
orientation of stakeholders at the field 
level focused. 
The corruption variable proxy affects 
the customs and excise revenues 
negatively and significantly with a 
coefficient of 0.182085. This means that 
an increase in the corruption index by 1 
point causes a decrease in customs and 
excise receipts by 18 points. This 
corruption proxies are closely related to 
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the previous proxy, namely the legal 
index, where higher legal index actually 
decreases state revenues. One of the 
transmissions is the practice of 
corruption. If the level of corruption 
increases, the legal index will increase in 
the framework of the judicial process 
against the perpetrators of corruption. 
Thus, a combination of these two 
proxies will cause the customs and 
excise collection activities to be 
disrupted. Another domino effect that 
can emerge is public unrest because of 
the mental deterioration of the state 
administrators so that public confidence 
decreases, including from the business 
world, it also decreases. 
Hors (2001) explained the role of the 
government especially supervision in the 
strategic sector is crucial. One of them in 
the sector of administration of excise and 
excise is prone to play between 
employees and customs and excise 
payers. There needs to be a high level of 
awareness and motivation that every 
rupiah collected is the main funding 
source of economic development 
activities being carried out by the 
government. In the end, the slightest 
corruption will make the habit start from 
certain individual then group together to 
collude. Then, when more parties are 
involved, in the end the sustainability of 
the economic development program is 
threatened. 
The bureaucratic proxy has a 
positive and significant effect on 
customs and excise revenues with a 
coefficient of 0.18019, which means that 
1 point increase in the bureaucratic index 
results in greater revenues from customs 
and excise received by the state. This 
proxy is certainly very closely related to 
several previous proxies, especially the 
government. Furthermore, in various 
previous studies conducted primarily by 
(Massawe and Epaphra, 2017) 
reinforcing the findings of this study that 
the role of government is very important 
for the sustainability of sustainable state 
revenues. The role of the government as 
a regulator as well as implementing it 
are two things that must support each 
other. 
Based on five influential proxies, the 
institutional reform variable is 
represented using a proxy index of law, 
government, corruption, and 
bureaucracy, while for political reform 
variables only the proxy of democracy 
influences customs and excise receipts. 
Other proxies, namely ethnicity, 
socioeconomics and investment have no 
effect on customs and excise revenues. 
Furthermore, from the ECT(-1) 
residual stationary test and the Johansen 
co-integration test, it is further 
strengthened that if the government 
focuses on continuing to improve 
proxies which empirically affect customs 
and excise revenues, the variable will 
increasingly show the magnitude of the 
effect on customs duties in the long run. 
However, basically after reforming, the 
next task is to continue to improve it so 
that the reform indicators can continue to 
show a good impact on Indonesia's 
economic development that is 
sustainable and inclusive. Then, it is 
expected that all members and layers of 
society can get the benefit. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARK 
 
High state revenues are things that 
state leaders always rely on. One of the 
main income in the state budget is from 
customs and excise. However, many 
factors influence the performance of 
customs and excise receipts. One 
problem that needs to be addressed is the 
reforms carried out by the government in 
the context of a more effective and 
efficient state administration. Based on 
empirical results, it is explained that the 
role of government is urgently important 
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as a regulator including in the legal sector 
in an effort to fight corruption and 
improve bureaucracy better. In addition, 
the democracy adopted by Indonesia 
contributed to the process of community 
thinking. In essence, political education 
for democracy must be the government's 
main concern. This can be executed 
through the implementation of political 
education and democracy in the higher 
education institution which is a place for 
the development of the identity of future 
generations. Hopefully, these activities 
will create a society that has a high sense 
of nationalism. Then it will make them 
feel that they are always in debt to the 
state and want to pay it by giving 
contributions, one of them is awareness 
in the taxation sector and the excise 
component. 
 
6. LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
 
This study employes time series data 
and the issue that is always faced when 
using the data is the availability of data, 
especially on each proxy used. As we 
know, data from ICRG only provides the 
latest data until 2016, even though the 
latest customs and excise receipt data is 
in 2018. In the end, this study removes 
variable customs and excise data in 2017 
and 2018 to better suit ICRG data which 
only until 2016. Furthermore, in the 
future, more research can be developed, 
especially using more varied proxies to 
enrich the analysis. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Series Prob. Lag   Max Lag Obs 
Bureaucracy  0,1311  7  7  24 
Democracy  0,5251  0  7  31 
Ethnicity  0,3541  0  7  31 
Law  0,2932  4  7  27 
Investment  0,2190  0  7  31 
Corruption  0,5821  0  7  31 
Government  0,1401  0  7  31 
Socioeconomics  0,3231  0  7  31 
Customs  0,7930  0  7  31 
Note: ADF stasionerity test at level 
 
Series Prob. Lag   Max Lag Obs 
Customs  0.0001  0  6  30 
Government  0.0001  0  6  30 
Socioeconomics  0.0099  0  6  30 
invesment  0.0006  0  6  30 
Corruption  0.0231  0  6  30 
Law  0.0740  0  6  30 
Ethniciity  0.0504  0  6  30 
Democracy  0.0008  1  6  29 
Bureaucracy  0.0039  1  6  29 
Note: ADF stasionerity test at first difference 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Year Gove
rnme
nt 
Soci
oEc
ono
mics 
Inve
stme
nt 
Cor
rupt
ion 
Law Eth
nic 
Demo
cracy 
Bur
eauc
racy 
Customs Excises 
1985 7,00 7,00 6,83 1,00 2,00 1,08 3,00 0,00 541,3 873,8 
1986 6,33 5,92 5,08 0,33 2,00 1,00 3,00 0,00 674,3 879,9 
1987 6,00 5,00 5,00 0,00 2,00 1,00 3,00 0,00 1.269,30 1.002,60 
1988 6,00 4,67 5,00 0,00 2,00 1,00 3,00 0,00 1.441,50 1.105,40 
1989 5,50 5,25 6,17 0,00 2,00 1,08 3,00 0,00 1.376,10 1.410,40 
1990 5,75 8,58 8,33 0,33 2,00 2,00 3,00 0,00 2.800 1.800 
1991 7,00 8,50 8,92 2,00 2,58 2,58 3,00 0,00 2.871 1.915 
1992 6,08 7,00 7,08 2,67 3,58 3,00 3,00 1,25 3.223 2.242 
1993 6,17 7,00 7,00 3,00 4,00 3,00 3,00 2,00 3.555 2.626 
1994 7,00 7,00 6,33 3,00 4,00 3,00 3,00 2,00 3.900 3.153 
1995 7,00 7,00 6,00 3,00 4,67 3,00 3,00 2,00 3.029 3.593 
1996 9,25 7,83 7,42 3,00 4,75 3,00 3,17 2,00 2.579 4.263 
1997 10,75 7,50 7,75 2,42 4,00 3,00 2,50 2,00 2.999 5.101 
1998 7,92 3,33 4,00 1,25 2,50 2,08 1,00 2,00 2.306 7.733 
1999 9,08 3,00 4,83 1,08 2,00 2,00 2,58 2,83 2.871 1.915 
2000 8,58 2,25 5,00 1,92 2,00 2,00 4,00 3,00 6.697 11.287 
2001 7,83 2,00 5,13 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,00 2,33 9.026 17.394 
2002 8,92 2,00 4,50 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,00 2,00 10.344 23.189 
2003 8,88 2,75 5,50 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,13 2,00 10.885 26.277 
2004 7,21 3,50 6,21 1,00 2,67 2,00 4,83 2,00 12.444 29.173 
2005 7,04 4,00 6,75 1,00 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 14.921 33.256 
2006 7,13 5,96 9,13 2,33 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 12.140 37.772 
2007 7,54 6,67 9,00 3,04 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 16.699 44.680 
2008 7,08 5,67 9,00 3,58 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 22.800 51.300 
2009 8,75 5,75 9,00 3,83 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 18.100 56.700 
2010 7,75 6,29 8,88 3,00 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 20.000 66.200 
2011 7,67 6,50 7,54 3,00 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 25.300 77.000 
2012 5,83 5,92 7,33 3,00 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 24.738 83.267 
2013 4,88 6,00 7,50 3,00 3,00 2,00 5,00 2,00 30.812 104.730 
2014 6,00 6,00 8,50 3,00 3,00 2,00 4,75 2,00 35.676 117.450 
2015 6,54 5,79 7,42 3,00 2,54 2,00 4,00 2,00 37.204 145.740 
2016 6,92 5,67 7,71 3,00 2,50 2,00 4,00 2,00 33.372 148.091 
 Note: Data 
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